Evidence Hub
Clear, sourced information you can use when supporting schemes or talking to neighbours and councillors.
Housing need
Local authority targets, shortfalls and waiting lists.
Affordability
House price to earnings ratios and rent burden data.
Delivery stats
Completions vs targets and the impact of delays.
Myth-busting
Common objections answered with evidence and examples.
Housing need
England has a persistent, measurable shortfall of homes. The numbers below are useful when writing representations: they show why well-designed schemes that increase supply are a material consideration.
1.3 million
Households on local authority social housing waiting lists in England (around March 2025).
~119 years
Estimated time to clear the social housing waiting list at the recent rate of new social rent homes (Shelter analysis).
208,600
Net additional dwellings in England in 2024–25 — down 6% on the previous year and well below the pace needed for national targets.
Future need — and the historic backlog
Two complementary figures are useful when arguing for more homes: how many we need to build going forward, and how large the accumulated shortfall already is.
Government target (England)
The current government aims to deliver 1.5 million homes in England over this Parliament (roughly 2024–2029). That implies an average pace of around 300,000 homes a year. Recent delivery (208,600 net additions in 2024–25) is running well below that level.
Standard Method (planning system minimum)
The official Standard Method calculates a minimum local housing need figure for each English local planning authority. Under recent versions of the method, the England-wide total has sat in the region of ~300,000 dwellings a year. This is the starting point used in local plans and is the figure most relevant to individual planning decisions.
Historic backlog (Centre for Cities)
Separate analysis by the Centre for Cities estimates that Britain has a cumulative backlog of around 4.3 million homes that were never built, relative to comparable European countries. Even at 300,000 homes a year, clearing that backlog would take many decades. Their 2023 report, The housebuilding crisis: The UK’s 4 million missing homes, is the main source for this figure.
In short: the Standard Method and government target describe the forward rate of building needed; the Centre for Cities figure describes the accumulated shortfall. Both point in the same direction — England needs substantially more homes than it is currently delivering.
Why this matters in planning decisions
- 1.Material consideration. Housing need is a recognised material planning consideration. Local plans and the National Planning Policy Framework require decision-makers to boost the supply of homes.
- 2.Local shortfalls are real. Most local authorities are not delivering enough homes against their assessed need (Standard Method or local housing need figures). Supporting deliverable schemes helps close that gap.
- 3.Social need is acute. With over a million households on waiting lists and only a few thousand new social rent homes completed in a typical recent year, every well-designed scheme that includes affordable or social homes carries extra weight.
- 4.Temporary accommodation costs. Around 128,000 households in England live in temporary accommodation. This imposes high costs on councils and poor outcomes for families. Increasing supply is one of the few structural answers.
How to use this in a representation
You do not need to be a planning expert. A short, factual paragraph is often enough. For example:
“England has more than 1.3 million households on social housing waiting lists and delivered only around 208,600 net additional dwellings in 2024–25 — well below the pace required to meet assessed need. This scheme would make a positive contribution to local housing supply. I support the application subject to appropriate design and affordable housing provision.”
Always check the latest local figures for the specific authority if you can (local plan housing trajectory, Authority Monitoring Report, or housing register data).
Primary sources
- MHCLG – Net additional dwellings, England 2024–25
- MHCLG – Live tables on rents, lettings and tenancies (waiting lists)
- MHCLG – Housing and economic needs assessments (Standard Method guidance)
- Centre for Cities – The housebuilding crisis: The UK’s 4 million missing homes (2023)
- Shelter – Social housing waiting list analysis
- planning.data.gov.uk – Open planning and housing datasets
Affordability
Homes in England are far less affordable relative to earnings than they were a generation ago. That is not mainly because people earn less — it is because prices have risen much faster than wages, in large part because supply has not kept up with demand.
England today
7.6×
Median house price to median full-time earnings in England in 2025 (ONS). Median home £300,000; median earnings £39,300.
Late 1990s
~3×
House price to earnings ratios were typically around 3 times in the mid-to-late 1990s (Nationwide / long-run series). Around 2000 the England median was roughly 4–4.5 times.
Peak stretch
~9–10×
Ratios peaked near or above 9–10 times around 2021–22 in some official and lender measures before a modest improvement as earnings caught up a little.
What the rise in the ratio means
A generation ago, a typical home cost roughly three to four times typical full-time earnings. Today it costs closer to seven or eight times — and in high-demand areas far more. That shift is the core of the affordability problem for first-time buyers and many renters trying to save a deposit.
- •Deposit barrier. Higher price-to-earnings ratios mean larger deposits in absolute terms. High rents make it harder to save, locking more people out of ownership.
- •Regional extremes. London and parts of the Greater South East have long had much higher ratios than the national median. Affordability pressures are most severe where jobs and opportunity are concentrated.
- •Modest recent improvement is not the full story. Since 2021 earnings have grown faster than prices in many areas, so the national ratio has eased a little (ONS 2025: 7.6). It remains far above long-run norms and above levels that younger households experienced in the 1990s and early 2000s.
Why more supply improves the earnings ratio
House prices are set by the balance of demand and supply. When demand rises (more households, higher incomes, cheaper credit) and supply cannot respond, prices absorb the pressure. England’s housing supply is unusually inelastic — research finds local supply responds only weakly to price rises over multi-decade periods.
- •Inelastic supply amplifies price rises. Academic and government-backed work (including studies of English local authorities) shows that tighter planning and physical constraints reduce how much new building responds to higher prices. Demand shocks then feed more strongly into prices — and into the price-to-earnings ratio.
- •More homes, lower long-run prices relative to incomes. Increasing the rate of housebuilding does not instantly reset prices, but sustained higher supply is the main structural way to prevent the ratio drifting higher and, over time, to bring it down. That is why planning decisions that unlock well-located, well-designed homes matter for affordability.
- •Interest rates are not the whole story. Low rates and credit conditions affect how much people can borrow, but they do not explain why ratios stayed high even when rates rose, or why shortages are worst in high-demand cities with the tightest supply response.
In practical terms: supporting schemes that add net new homes in areas of need is one of the few levers that directly addresses the supply side of the affordability problem.
How to use this in a representation
A short, factual point is usually enough:
“Median house prices in England are still around 7–8 times median full-time earnings — roughly double the ratio typical in the late 1990s. Constrained supply is a major reason prices have outpaced incomes. This scheme would add to local housing supply and, over time, help ease that pressure. I support the application subject to good design and appropriate affordable housing.”
Delivery stats
England is not building enough homes. Delivery is well below the pace implied by national targets, and the pipeline of new permissions has been weak — which means the shortfall is not just a one-year problem.
Delivered 2024–25
208,600
Net additional dwellings in England (MHCLG) — down 6% on 2023–24 and far short of ~300,000 a year.
Annual target pace
~300,000
Implied yearly rate to hit 1.5 million homes in England over this Parliament. Last achieved at scale in the late 1960s / early 1970s.
Permissions pipeline
Weak
Permissions for homes in the year to June 2025 were about 221,000 — down on the previous year and part of a multi-year decline in the pipeline.
Completions vs need
Net additional dwellings are the official measure of how many homes are added to the stock each year (new builds, conversions and changes of use, minus demolitions). In 2024–25 England added 208,600 — roughly two-thirds of the ~300,000 annual pace needed for the government’s 1.5 million target over the Parliament.
- •Below recent averages too. Over the decade before the latest dip, net additions averaged a little over 220,000 a year — still well short of 300,000.
- •Parliament progress is behind. Independent trackers using official estimates show that cumulative delivery since July 2024 is only a fraction of the 1.5 million target, so the annual rate would need to rise substantially to catch up.
- •Local plans and the Housing Delivery Test already treat under-delivery as a planning issue. Supporting deliverable schemes is one way to close the gap in areas that are falling short.
Pipeline and the cost of delay
Homes are not built the year permission is granted. A weak pipeline of approvals today means weaker completions in two to five years’ time. Recent years have seen a sustained fall in the number of homes granted permission — industry and government data both point to a pipeline that is too thin to support a step-change in delivery.
- •Permissions lag need. In the year to June 2025, permission was granted for around 221,000 homes in England — down 7% on the previous year and part of a longer decline from peaks earlier in the decade.
- •Large schemes take years. Research on major developments shows planning and post-permission processes can stretch for many years. Every year of delay is a year those homes are not available to households who need them.
- •Delay has wider costs. Delayed schemes mean delayed construction jobs, delayed council tax and New Homes Bonus-type receipts, and continued pressure on temporary accommodation and private rents. Supporting timely, well-designed applications helps lock in future supply.
Granting permission for a good scheme does not guarantee it is built overnight — but refusing or indefinitely delaying sound proposals guarantees those homes will not be delivered on that site.
How to use this in a representation
Keep it short and factual:
“England added only 208,600 net additional dwellings in 2024–25 against an implied need of around 300,000 a year to meet national targets. The permissions pipeline has also been weak. Approving this deliverable scheme would make a direct contribution to closing that gap. I support the application subject to appropriate design and affordable housing.”
Myth-busting
Objections to new homes often rest on claims that sound plausible but do not hold up under scrutiny. Below are some of the most common myths — and the evidence that answers them. Use these points to keep representations factual and calm.
Myth
“There is no housing shortage — look at all the empty homes.”
Reality: Long-term empty homes in England are a small share of the stock (typically around 1% empty for six months or more). Bringing every suitable empty home back into use would help at the margins, but it cannot close a shortfall measured in hundreds of thousands of homes a year, or a multi-million historic backlog. Vacancy rates in the UK are among the lower rates in Europe. Shortage is real in the places people need to live and work.
Myth
“Building more homes will not bring prices down.”
Reality: In markets with constrained supply, extra demand mostly pushes prices up. England’s housing supply responds only weakly to price rises. Sustained higher building is the main structural way to stop price-to-earnings ratios drifting higher and, over time, to ease them. One scheme will not reset national prices overnight — but systematically blocking supply is how we got to 7–8× earnings from ~3× a generation ago.
Myth
“Brownfield alone is enough — we do not need to build on green fields.”
Reality: Brownfield should be used first where it is suitable, viable and in the right place. It is not enough on its own. Much brownfield is contaminated, poorly located, or already allocated and still not delivering at the scale required. High-demand areas often have limited brownfield relative to need. Sensible policy uses both brownfield and carefully chosen greenfield / grey-belt sites next to existing settlements and transport.
Myth
“New homes always ruin character and overdevelop the area.”
Reality: Design and density matter. Poor schemes should be improved or refused. Good schemes respect local character, scale and materials — and many of the places people love most were once “new”. Character is not the same as freezing a neighbourhood in time. Planning already tests design quality; the answer to bad design is better design, not a blanket ban on homes.
Myth
“Infrastructure cannot cope — schools, GPs and roads are full.”
Reality: Capacity constraints are real in some places and must be planned for. They are not a permanent reason to stop housing. New development contributes through Section 106 and the Community Infrastructure Levy (and successor mechanisms) toward schools, health and transport. Refusing homes does not fund infrastructure — it leaves both housing need and service pressure unaddressed. Infrastructure should be planned with growth, not used as a veto against it.
Myth
“Developers are landbanking — just force them to build what they already have permission for.”
Reality: Some delay between permission and completion is normal (conditions, finance, infrastructure, market absorption). Systematic “landbanking” as the main cause of the shortage is not supported by the overall numbers: permissions and completions have both been too low relative to need. Forcing faster build-out on existing sites may help at the margin, but it does not remove the need for a larger pipeline of new permissions in the right places.
Myth
“New homes only go to investors / second-home owners / people from outside the area.”
Reality: Investor and second-home demand is a genuine issue in some coastal and hotspot areas and can be addressed with local policy tools. Nationally, most new homes are occupied by households who need somewhere to live. Affordable and social housing quotas, local-connection policies where justified, and proper plan-led allocation are better responses than blocking supply for everyone.
Myth
“New housing will crash the value of existing homes.”
Reality: Well-designed new housing does not systematically destroy nearby values. In many cases good development supports local amenities and demand. The larger risk to living standards is not a modest easing of scarcity prices — it is locking the next generation out of ownership and stable tenancies while prices stay extreme relative to earnings. Planning should weigh the public interest in adequate housing, not only short-term asset prices.
How to use this in a representation
You do not need to rebut every objection at length. One or two calm, factual points are often enough, for example:
“Concerns about infrastructure and character are important and should be addressed through design and developer contributions. They do not remove the need for more homes: England is delivering well below assessed need, and affordability remains far worse than a generation ago. I support this application subject to good design and appropriate mitigation.”
This is a starting set of the most common myths. We will expand it with local examples, further sources and links to the Toolkit as the campaign grows.
Ready to use this in a real application?
The Support Toolkit walks you through writing a clear, evidence-based representation.
Go to the Toolkit